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Abstract_______________________________________________________________
Long run economic progress in modern Spain is assessed in this paper and its
comparative performance placed in historical perspective. Over one and a half centuries,
income per person rose 15 times. Three main phases can be established: 1850-1950, 1951-
1974 and 1975-2000. The finding of growth continuity between mid-nineteenth and mid-
twentieth century is at odds with the widespread view of a nineteenth century of failure and
a successful twentieth century. Spain underperformed in the long run mostly due to its
sluggish growth in the hundred years up to 1950. Higher destruction of human capital than
of physical capital during the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath help explain her weaker
post-World War II performance. Catching up took place in the late twentieth century, in
which the years 1959-74 stand out. Structural change contributed significantly to growth
acceleration while lack of exposition to international competition represents a recurrent
element of retardation.
JEL classification: N13, N14, N33, N34, O47, O52
Keywords: Growth, structural change, catching-up, Spain, Europe
3Accounts of economic performance in modern Spain tell a story of failure and
retardation up to mid-twentieth century that led way to fast growth after 1960. Exogenous
explanations are provided in which inadequate natural resources, low human capital
endowment, foreign ‘dependency’, and inefficient institutions share the blame for the poor
performance prior to mid-twentieth century but they fail to explain why the economic
situation was reversed so dramatically thereafter2.
My goal in this paper is a more modest and preliminary one: I will try and assess
long-run economic progress in modern Spain and place its performance during the Golden
Age and its aftermath in historical perspective. In section I economic trends over the long
run are described; the contribution of the demographic transition and structural change to
growth is discussed in section II; section III offers an international perspective of Spain’s
performance. Section IV concludes.
I. Long-run performance: An Overview
Aggregate economic activity multiplied by 40 over one hundred and fifty years at
trend growth rate of 2.4 percent per year. If we deduct a population increase of more than
two and half times we find that, at the end of the twentieth century, per capita GDP was 15
times larger than at mid-nineteenth century (at a trend annual rate of 1.7 percent). Such a
significant improvement did not take place at a steady rate. Spain’s GDP series is trend
stationary with structural breaks in level (1936) and in trend (1951 and 1975) (See
Appendix)3. Three main phases: 1850-1950, 1951-1974 and 1975-2000, can be, then,
established with a shift to a lower level during the first period resulting from the Civil War
(1936-1939)4. In the Golden Age (1950-1974) GDP per capita rose seven times more
rapidly than during the previous hundred years (1850-1950) and twice as fast as during the
2 Cf. Tortella (1994b).
3 A change of trend indicates a break in the long-term rate of growth while a change in level represents an
increase or, as in the case of the Civil War years, a drop in economic activity which does not alter the
established growth rate. It should be distinguished between the trend growth rate and the GDP level, the
former being the relevant one to establish a periodisation. Thus, the relevant fact for accepting 1951 as
structural break is that the trend growth rate change after this year and not that the GDP level was lower in
1951 than in 1929.
4 If the slump caused by the Civil War were not taken into account the trend growth rate would reach 2.6
percent. The difference between these two figures, 0.2 percent, could be interpreted as the reduction in the
4last quarter of the twentieth century. Thus the rate of growth experienced between 1850 and
1950 meant that product per person doubled every 99 years while the same increase was
achieved every 13 years in 1951-1974 and every 27 years over 1975-2000 (Table 1).
GRAPH 1
The view of continuity in Spain’s economic growth between 1850 and 1950
contrasts with the widely held interpretation of the nineteenth century as a period of
economic failure and that of the twentieth century as one of success (Tortella 1994a), while
confirms previous findings for the period 1850-1935 by Cubel and Palafox (1998), and
Carreras (1987, 1992). Phases or long swings in which growth rates differ from the long-
run trend as a result of economic policies, access to international markets and technological
change can be distinguished5 .
TABLE 1
During the first phase, 1850-1883, the rate of growth of product per person was well
above the nineteenth century’s average. It can be partly attributed to a ‘reconstruction
effect’ after the political instability and social unrest of the early nineteenth century in
which demographic expansion would have cancelled out most of the moderate growth in
output6. Institutional reforms and opening up to foreign capital and international trade lie
beneath the significant growth experienced during the next three decades. Inflows of
foreign capital made it possible to break the close connection between investment and
savings and contributed to the economic growth (Prados de la Escosura 2006b).
A slowdown in growth took place between the mid 1880s and 1920. This was a
period of institutional stability that presumably provided a favourable environment for
investment and growth yet both permanent and temporary factors worked against it.
long run annual growth rate caused by the civil conflict (8 % [=0.2/2.4]). If we consider the effect on product
per person, the corresponding figure is 0.25 percent annually which represents a drop of almost 15 percent.
5 The phases defined in the lower panel of Table 1 correspond with the time division arising from
econometrically estimated deviations from the established trend (Prados de la Escosura 2003). Growth rates
are measured as average annual logarithmic rates of change over periods delimited by peak years. These rates
have a clearer meaning than trend growth rates based on statistical adjustment. In addition, they have additive
properties.
6 The fact that per capita income improved little over 1815-1850 should not obscure the achievement of
maintaining the standard of living despite the acceleration in population growth (Cf. Prados de la Escosura
1988 and Rosés 2003). Pérez Moreda (1999: 44) calculates a demographic growth of 0.76 percent between
1821 and 1860 compared with 0.42 percent for the eighteenth century.
5Restrictions on both internal and external competition help to explain sluggish
growth despite institutional stability during most of the Restauración (1875-1923) (Fraile
Balbín 1998). Increasing tariff protection, together with exclusion from the prevailing
international monetary system, the gold standard, represented a major obstacle to Spain’s
integration in the international economy7. The Cuban War of Independence, despite the
already weakened economic links between the Spain and its colony, caused significant
macroeconomic instability that brought forward the fall of the peseta and worsened Spain’s
international economic isolation8. Although the loss of Cuba had little direct economic
impact, the protectionist and isolationist tendencies of the early twentieth century could
have been its political consequence (Fraile Balbín and Escribano 1998). Macroeconomic
instability reduced capital flows leading to the depreciation of the peseta –with a significant
lag with respect to the cease of convertibility- that, in turn, increased the cost of emigrating
and, hence reduced the outward flow of labour9. The move towards isolation can be seen in
the evolution of relative factor prices. The land rent/wage ratio tended to fall between the
early 1890s and the First World War (Prados de la Escosura 2006a) while the opposite
pattern is observed in open European countries (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999).
The pre-1914 years saw a brief period of increased activity coinciding with the
peseta’s recovery since 190510. During World War I, instead, economic activity hardly
progressed (below 0.6 percent annually) stagnating in per capita terms. This result is in
stark contradiction with the conventional view that stresses its stimulating aggregate
effects11.
The most intense growth of the period 1850-1950 was achieved in the 1920s, and as
it coincided with the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship (1923-1929) economists and historians
have inevitably tended to make connections. Intervention in and regulation of economic
activity increased during the Dictatorship (Comín 1987, Fraile 1998). The hypothesis that
7 Cf. Tena (1999), Palafox (1999) and Pardos (1998) on tariff protection and its effects. See Martín Aceña
(1994) and Bordo and Rockoff (1996) on the gold standard.
8 See the discussion in Fraile and Escribano (1998), Maluquer de Motes (1999) and Prados de la Ecosura
(2006b).
9 Cf. Martín Aceña (1999) and Prados de la Escosura (2006b) on mobility of capital and Sánchez Alonso
(2000) on emigration.
10 Between 1905 and 1913 absolute GDP grew at a rate of 2.5 percent while GDP per capita did so by 1.8
percent.
11 Cf. Roldán and García Delgado (1973) for the established view on the impact of the Great War on Spain.
6Government intervention in the form of protectionist measures and regulation and through
investment in infrastructure were decisive factors behind this growth has been widely
accepted (Velarde 1968). The emphasis on tariff protectionism tends to neglect, however,
that Spain opened up to international factor flows during the 1920s. A significant inflow of
foreign capital allowed the purchase of capital goods and raw materials which contributed
to growth acceleration (Prados de la Escosura 2006b)12.
Lastly, a fourth long swing took place between 1929 and 1952. The effects of the
Depression in aggregate terms were comparatively milder but more persistent13. The lively
performance of the 1920s, with rising GDP and private consumption per capita, does not
support the old stereotype that deprivation and poverty, in a context of economic
stagnation, led to the Civil War (1936-39). It could argued that rapid growth led to a ‘war
of attrition’ regarding income distribution that intensified social and political tensions14.
However, the fact that the Civil War (1936-39) broke off after one and a half decades of
inequality decline and poverty alleviation (Prados de la Escosura 2006a) demands new
explanatory hypotheses. Lagged perceptions of inequality and extreme poverty and
unfulfilled expectations by those at the bottom of the distribution might lie at the roots of
the civil conflict. Moreover, a process of polarization that triggered social and political
conflict can be compatible with stable or declining inequality.
The weak recovery of the years from 1944 to 1952 stands out in the international
context. In spite of World War II, European economies outperformed Spain (achieving an
average growth rate of 1.4 compared with Spain’s 0.6) during the 1940s (Crafts and Mills
1996: 421). Spain’s economy did not recover pre-war GDP levels (1929) until 1951 (in
absolute terms), and 1955 (in per capita terms); in Europe, in contrast, it only took an
average of 6 years to return to the pre-war level of income per capita and by 1953 all
12 It has also been noted that the positive situation of the current account balance of payments during the First
World War contributed to the boom of the 1920s (Sudrià 1990).
13 In comparison with the nations which succeeded in abandoning the Gold Standard early (Eichengreen
1992), Spain did not experience a quick recovery. A restrictive public spending policy and the interruption of
public projects in progress, together with political uncertainty has been pointed as the main causes of the
1930s crisis (Palafox 1991). Another view sustains, however, that expansionary monetary and anti-cyclical
fiscal policies were tried to compensate for the fall in private investment and exports (Comín and Martín
Aceña 1984, García Santos and Martín Aceña 1990).
14 There are historical examples of a link between relative deprivation and conflict following a period of
economic expansion: France at the end of the 18th century (Crouzet 1967), Russia in the early years of the 20th
century (Gregory 1994) and Mexico following the Porfiriato (Coatsworth 1990).
7Western European countries had done so15. True that post-bellum Spain was surrounded by
countries at war (Velarde 1993), but the fact that its economy only grew at a rate of 2.4
percent between 1944 and 1952 shows that only a slow recovery took place after a
relatively mild contraction. Actually, at the trough during the Civil War (1938) Spain’s
GDP was equal to that of 1920 (and in per capita terms, to that of 1910), while the
corresponding year during World War II for France’s GDP was equivalent to that of 1891
and for Italy and Germany, to that of 1908 (Crafts and Toniolo 1996: 4).
The war destruction of physical capital was suffered mainly in housing, the
transport network and livestock with the effect in industrial areas being limited. The
destruction of physical capital can be estimated at around 8 per cent of the existing stock of
capital in 1935, which would represent an average level of destruction in the context of
World War II, although the concentration on productive capital (especially transport
material) meant that levels of destruction caused by the conflict in Spain were far from
negligible (Prados de la Escosura and Rosés 2006)16 . The exile after the Civil War and,
possibly to a larger extent, the internal exile, resulting from political repression of Franco’s
dictatorship meant the loss of a considerable amount of Spain’s limited human capital
(Núñez 2003, Ortega and Silvestre 2005)17.
The change in trend which began in 1951 ushered in an exceptional phase of rapid
growth which lasted until 1974. It is worth highlighting the fact that during the Golden Age
(1950-1973), the main spurt of economic growth in Spain, as in other countries in the
European Periphery, was delayed until the 1960s (Maddison 2001).
During the 1950s, industrialisation in Spain was largely dependent on internal
demand. Import capacity’s volatility rendered investment risky and tended to penalise
capital accumulation, while inflows of foreign capital and new technology were restricted.
In a way, Spain’s case supports the counterfactual which maintains that without the
Marshall Plan, Inter-war commodity and factor markets intervention, including quantitative
restrictions on international trade and exchange controls would have persisted as the main
15 According to Maddison (1996), Belgium, Holland and France did so in 1949, Italy in 1950 and Germany in
1953.
16 cf. Barciela (1986), Catalan (1995), Malefakis (1987) and Sánchez Asiaín (1999).
17 Regarding interior and exterior exile, cf. López (1991, 1996) and Plá (1994, 1999).
8economic policies18. The move towards a pro-market attitude with deregulation and the
gradual opening up of the economy which began with the 1959 reforms resulted in
sustained growth and catching up with Western Europe during the late twentieth century.
II. Demographic transition, structural change, and growth
In developing countries the transition to a modern demographic regime and the
reallocation of resources from agriculture towards sectors with higher productivity plays a
significant part in accelerating economic growth. How large was their contribution in the
historical case of Spain?
During the demographic transition, the increase in the dependency ratio caused by
the rise in fertility will tend to reduce the potential workforce compared within the total
population19. Later, as those born during the demographic boom reach working age, the
relative size of this potential workforce will increase before falling again as population
ages. The potential effect of demographic change on per capita GDP is reflected in a time
lag between the growth rate of the working-age population and that of the total population
(Bloom and Williamson 1998)20. Their annual rates of change, once short-term fluctuations
were eliminated with a Hodrick-Prescott filter (Graph 2) show that such a time lag is
clearly visible, especially around the mid nineteenth century, in the second quarter of the
twentieth century and, again, during its last 20 years. Graph 3 shows the relation between
the size of the working-age population and the dependent population, with this ratio
increasing in the periods 1860-80, 1920-50, and 1980-2000.
GRAPHS 2 AND 3
Another way to look at the contribution of the demographic transition to growth can
be obtained by breaking down per capita GDP into its components using an identity in
which Gross Domestic Product per person (GDP/N) equals product per occupied worker
(GDP/L) times the rate of employment (L/EAP), times the activity rate (that is the ratio of
the economically active population [EAP] to the population ages 15 to 64 or potentially
18 The idea that the Marshall Plan’s main contribution was to encourage a pro-market economic policy has
been suggested by Eichengreen and Uzan (1992). Calvo (1999, 2001) has shown that in Spain there are
similarities between the incentives for the market to operate as a mechanism of resource allocation provided
by the USA-Spain agreements of 1953 and the Marshall Plan in Europe.
19 The dependency ratio is the proportion of the total population either under the age of 15 or over the age of
65.
20 Cf. Williamson (1998) and Higgins and Williamson (1997).
9active population, [PAP]) times the ratio between the potential labour force (PAP) and the
total population (N):
(1) GDP/N = (GDP/ L) * (L/EAP)* (EAP/PAP) * (PAP/N)
and in rates of change expressed in lower case letters,
(2) gdp/n = (gdp/ l) + (l/eap) + (eap/pap) + (pap/n)
TABLE 2
Table 2 shows the evolution of product per person and each of its components,
expressed in logarithmic rates of growth, for the long swings identified over the last century
and a half. A demographic gift –a larger share of working age population- was responsible
for a significant part of the per capita GDP growth during 1850-1866 and 1986-2000. The
demographic bonus also played a part in mitigating the economic slowdown during the
1930s and 1940s and, again, during the transition to democracy (1978-86). On the contrary,
in the Golden Age a negative demographic impact effected per capita income growth.
A raising rate of activity reinforced the demographic gift in 1855-74 and 1986-2000.
The increase in the activity rate also played a beneficial role during the Golden Age and
after Spain’s admission into the European Community. Its fall proved, however, an obstacle
to growth during the Civil War and World War II, and again during the transition to
democracy (1976-85) when it aggravated the negative impact of unemployment.
Labour productivity appears as the main determinant of per capita GDP growth and
shadows it closely. Nonetheless, there are important exceptions: productivity overcame per
capita GDP growth during 1959-74 and again the ‘transition to democracy’ decade (1975-
85). Conversely, from 1986 to 2000 productivity change lagged way behind per capita
income growth. Employment creation (mostly in services) and productivity seem, thus, to
exhibit an inverse relationship during the last quarter of the twentieth century.
The increase in aggregate productivity can be broken down into the part contributed
by the increase in output per worker in each economic sector (internal productivity) and the
part which is caused by the shift of labour from less productive to more productive sectors
(structural change)21. The level of aggregate labour productivity (A), which is obtained by
21 As correctly pointed out by Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee (1982: 248-254), structural change is not
really exogenous as it is caused by the interaction between the supply and demand of resources. In this sense
the attempt to establish causal relationships between structural change and growth is flawed. From a historical
point of view, however, perfect factor mobility does not exist and, consequently differences of marginal
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dividing product (O) by employment (L) for the economy as a whole in the year j, can be
expressed as the result obtained by adding the productivity (Oi/Li) for each economic
sector i (i = 1,2, ..n), weighted according to each sector’s contribution to total employment
(Li/L)22.
(3) Aj = (O / L)j =(Oi / Li)j (Li / L) j =(Aij Uij)
where Ai is product per worker in sector i and Ui is the contribution of sector i to
total employment.
From a temporal perspective, using lower case letters to represent rates of change,
(4) aj =aij Uij +Aij uij
The method normally used for this calculation, shift-share analysis, involves
estimating, in the first place, internal productivity growth (the first item on the right), that is
the result obtained by adding the growth of output per worker in each economic sector
without varying the initial composition of employment. The difference between aggregate
productivity and internal productivity will then provide the contribution of structural
change.
This procedure is based on the assumption that, in the absence of labour shift
between sectors, the level of productivity and the corresponding growth rate for each sector
would have been identical to the actual ones. This assumption is not realistic in a case like
Spain’s in which if labour is quickly absorbed by industry and services, productivity tends
to remain stable or to fall23. It would seem more reasonable to assume that agricultural
productivity improved between 1950 and 1975 due to the reduction in the number of
workers. It is also true that output per worker in industry between 1974 and 1986 would
have grown more slowly if the number of workers had not fallen as a result of the industrial
restructuring (reconversión) which eliminated less competitive branches reducing both the
productivity between sectors tend to exist as the movement of resources from one sector to another does not
take place automatically. For this reason improvements in resource allocation will contribute to growth during
a given period of time. It is also the case that even when marginal productivity is the same in different
industries, they will not all grow at the same rate. Growth will depend on their use of technological innovation
and the existence of increasing returns.
22 I follow the procedure exposed by Broadberry (1998) in the subsequent paragraphs.
23 Broadberry (1998) puts forward the idea that if we accept, as proposed by Kindleberger (1967), that labour
moving from agriculture to industry and services is surplus labour, then it must be assumed that the
hypothetical return of this labour to the agricultural sector would have a negative effect on productivity.
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size of the sector and, consequently, industrial employment24. For this reason the
contribution of structural change to the increase in productivity obtained using the
conventional shift-share analysis is presented as a lower bound in Table 3. An upper bound
is obtained using a modified version of the conventional shift-share analysis which is
obtained by subtracting from aggregate productivity the figure which would result by
weighting product per worker growth in each sector according to its contribution to total
employment in the initial year. An exception is made, however, for those sectors where
contribution to employment falls (for example, agriculture over the whole period
considered and industry since 1975); here the difference between the increase in aggregate
employment and that of employment in that sector would be subtracted from output per
worker growth25. The result obtained using this method has been called an upper bound
because it does not take into account differences in levels of physical and human capital per
worker across economic sectors26. As Table 3 shows, the differences between upper and
lower bounds are considerable with the exception of the periods 1850-1883 and 1929-52.
TABLE 3
According to the upper bound estimate, structural change would account for two-
fifths of the aggregate productivity growth achieved over the last 150 years. This figure is
in line with Broadberry’s findings (1998) for Germany and the United States between 1870
and 199027. A closer look shows that between 1883 and 1929 structural change accounts for
half of the increase in labour productivity and this figure rises to almost three quarters
between 1873 and 1913. If we now focus on shorter cycles it can be shown that during
periods of deceleration of growth such as 1883-1913, without a shift of agricultural labour
towards industry and services, aggregate labour productivity would have grown by just 0.2
percent whilst the fall in level would have been even sharper in the early 1930s and the
24 This is suggested by the calculations of Suárez (1992) and van Ark (1995) regarding total factor
productivity and labour productivity respectively.
25 This procedure is suggested by Broadberry (1998). In this case internal productivity would be calculated as
a´ij Uij, where a i´j = aij – (lj - lij), if uij0 (l representing employment)
26 Actually, the contribution of structural change should be calculated in terms of total factor productivity
rather than in terms of labour productivity. The available evidence confirms, however, the importance of
structural change: between 1965 and 1975, total factor productivity increased by 6.5 percent in industry
compared with 2 percent in agriculture and 3.8 percent in aggregate terms (San Juan (1987); Gandoy (1988);
Myro (1983); Súarez (1992)). See also the recent research by Sanchis (2001) for 1958-75.
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post-war recovery (1945-52) would have been even weaker. During the ‘Golden Age’ one
third of aggregate labour productivity was due to structural change, while in the 1950s this
proportion represented more than a half28. Over the last quarter of the twentieth century
structural change has, once more, accounted for one-fourth of the increase in aggregate
labour productivity. In this phase, the slow transfer of labour away from agriculture (which
still employed one in four workers in 1975) was accompanied by the destruction of
employment in less competitive manufacturing industries, a situation which has led to more
than a 50 percent increase in employment in the service sector. Much of the explanation for
the rapid rise in labour productivity in agriculture since 1975 is to be found in this shift of
labour29. Structural change would also play a significant part in the increase in industrial
productivity between 1974 and 198630.
III. Spain’s position in the international economic context
Spain’s long term growth appears similar to that of western nations (Table 4). Such
a finding lends support to the view that the roots of most of today’s difference in living
standards between Spain and other advanced countries should be searched for in the pre-
1850 era.
TABLE 4
However, a closer look shows that long-run growth before 1950 was clearly lower
than in the advanced countries, while the opposite was true for the second half of the
twentieth century (Table 4, Panel A). Thus, Spain fell behind between 1850 and 1950. The
second half of the nineteenth century witnessed sustained per capita GDP growth while
paradoxically the gap with the industrialised countries widened over 1883-1913. Moreover,
Spain did not catch up during the first half of the twentieth century. The progress made in
the 1920s and the relatively mild impact of the 1930s crisis were more than outweighed by
27 Broadberry (1998: 390) estimates that for the increases in productivity of 1.75 percent and 1.43 percent in
Germany and the USA, structural change would account for a maximum of 45.7 percent and 50.3 percent
respectively.
28 The contribution of structural change is, it can be seen, far greater than the figure obtained by van Ark
(1996: 96), using the conventional shift-share analysis method (with 22 percent as the upper limit).
29 In the modified shift-share analysis method used here 4.7 percent (that is the difference between the growth
of total employment and that of agricultural employment) of the 6.2 percent increase in agricultural labour
productivity can be attributed to structural change.
30 As explained in the case of agriculture in the previous note, using this calculation method, 2.2 percent of
the 5 percent annual growth in industrial labour productivity would be caused by structural change (that is the
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Spain’s exclusion from the late 1930s recovery as a result of the Civil War. In the 1940s,
despite being non-belligerant in World War II, she grew more slowly than the warring
Western European nations. In the second half of the twentieth century, especially during the
Golden Age, Spain outperformed the advanced nations improving her relative international
position.
Nonetheless, to be properly assessed growth rates need to be related to the initial
level of per capita GDP. Evidence in Table 5 shows that at the beginning of the Golden Age
Spain’s income per head was way below that of industrial nations. Thus, within a
neoclassical growth framework although Spain reached western European pace of growth
in the 1950s, a faster one could have been expected from her lower initial per capita
income. A similar reasoning can be applied to the mid- or late nineteenth century Spain.
TABLE 5
On the whole, Spain’s relative position at the end of the twentieth century was
worse than it had been in 1850 and hardly improved since the late nineteenth century. In the
long run Spain exhibits a tendency to return to a stable position at around three quarters of
Western European per capita income (and half that of the USA). In fact, after her relative
position collapsing during the first two decades of Franco’s dictatorship (1939-59)
accelerated growth over 1960-75 allowed Spain to recover the international position she
attained at the beginning of the twentieth century. After a worsening during the decade of
‘transition to democracy’, a lively recovery led to much the same position in the late 1990s
as at the time of Franco’s death (1975). Does this mean that Spain’s steady state is lower
than that the advanced European nations?31.
What did determine Spain’s position relative to western European economies?. In
an attempt to provide an answer I have estimated a growth model for modern Europe in
which per capita GDP growth is associated to the initial levels of (log of) per capita income
and primary and secondary school enrolment (as proxies for initial physical and human
capital endowment), the average investment ratio to GDP and the growth of population (as
proxies for changes in the stock of physical capital and labour), resource allocation
indicators (that include the shift of resources away from agriculture, proxied by the initial
difference between the growth rate for total employment and that for industrial employment). Between 1986
and 1992, this would represent 1.5 percent of a total of 2.7 percent.
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share of active population in agriculture and by the (log of) average ratio of agricultural to
industrial output), and the change in openness (as measured by the rate of variation of the
export share in GDP) (Prados de la Escosura 2006c). A time trend dummy was added to
capture temporal changes in the dependent variable not associated with variations in the
independent variables (and to eliminate all variation between periods that makes the result
correspond to that of a weighted cross section).
Additionally, I allowed for a boost to growth from post-war episodes of
reconstruction (in the 1920s and 1950s) in an attempt to clarify the part of growth not easily
explained by the conventional variables of the (basic and augmented) neo-classical model.
The postwar to prewar ratio of physical capital per person, and changes in the human to
physical capital endowment ratio have been used in historical studies of European
reconstruction (Crafts 1992, Dumke 1990). In the former case I approximated it with the
post-war to pre-war income per head ratio (1920/1913 and 1950/1938) and its quadratic
term to incorporate its diminishing impact on growth. For the latter, as no data on human
and physical capital stocks were available for all countries in the sample I used schooling
and investment flows as proxies. Lagged values of the independent variables have been
used as instruments to take endogeneity into account. The regression results (Table 6)
shows a good fit with only over one-forth of the variance unexplained. A strong conditional
convergence effect appears to exist as measured by the negative and high coefficient of the
initial level of income (and shown by the speed of convergence), and the remaining
coefficients present the expected relations, positive for accumulation and openness, and
negative for tying resources to agriculture.
TABLE 6
Per capita GDP growth for Spain can be predicted using equations alternatively
representing the unconditional convergence, the basic and augmented (with human capital)
Solow, and structural models, the latter incorporating resource allocation, openness, and a
‘reconstruction’ effect (in the two alternative specifications described above) (Table 7).
This way the intuitive interpretation of Spain's historical performance presented earlier in
this paper can be tested.
TABLE 7
31 Since 2000 Spain has improved her position up to the relative level achieved by 1929.
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The predicted rate of per capita GDP growth for Spain represents the "potential"
growth within a European historical context under a common set of restrictions. The
comparison of the different predictions for Spain resulting from alternative growth models
deserves a few remarks. In the first place, with the exception of the Golden Age, the
unconditional convergence (col. I) forecasts a faster per capita growth than the Solow
model (col. II), a finding that suggests that the rate of capital accumulation was lower in
Spain than in the European case. Prior to 1920, weaker human capital accumulation also
contributes to explain the systematically lower growth forecasted by the augmented Solow
model (col. III) relative to the unconditional convergence one. The potential for growth that
results from structural change is highlighted by the fact that the predictions of the models
including resource allocation, openness, and a ‘reconstruction’ effect are systematically
above those of the unconditional convergence model for periods of accelerating growth
such as 1850-83 and 1958-7432. In fact, the growth differential in the predictions of the two
structural models (cols. IV and V) is very revealing, with a lower growth rate cast by the
structural model that uses the human capital to physical capital ratio as a proxy for the
‘reconstruction’ effect (col. V). Human capital endowment appears to be the key and model
V is the one that better predicts Spain’s economic performance in the second half of the
twentieth century. In Spain, (as opposed to German or Japanese experiences), the
destruction of human capital was higher than that of physical capital during the Spanish
Civil War and its repressive aftermath (the exile and, especially, the internal exile), and this
fact helps explain the weaker performance of Spain’s economy during the 1940s and the
early Golden Age.
When the models’ predicted growth are confronted with the actual rates, it clearly
appears that Spain underperformed over the long run mostly due to its sluggish growth in
the hundred years up to 1950. The Golden Age, especially, the period 1958-74, and the last
one and a half decades of the twentieth century stand out as years of outstanding
performance (with the 1920s just below it!). A closer look singles out 1866-73, 1964-74,
and 1986-92 as cycles of overachievement. The Restauración (namely 1875-1923 but
arbitrarily restricted here to 1883-1920), the 1930s and 1940s, and the transition to
32 And, if the structural model presented in equation (4) (col. IV of Table 7) is employed, also for the 1920s,
the 1950s, and 1974-2000.
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democracy after Franco’s death (1975-85) stand out, in turn, as those phases responsible for
Spain’s poorer economic performance relative to western Europe.
How much did structural change contribute to the model’s predicted growth can be
established, for example, by simulating ceteris paribus the impact of maintaining fixed
either the sectoral resource allocation, the change in openness, or the rate of capital
accumulation of, say, the previous period, on the rate of forecasted growth. Thus, it appears
that without the moderate shift of resources away from agriculture that took place in the
Restauración growth would have been slightly over three-fourths of the model’s predicted
rate. In the decade of ‘transition to democracy’ (1976-85) it would have represented two-
thirds of the forecasted growth (when the shift away from agriculture and non competitive
industry is taken into account). Capital accumulation, in turn, mattered especially during
the 1920s and 1950s and the counterfactual growth that would have been achieved with the
investment rate of the previous period represents three-fourths and two-thirds, respectively,
of the predicted per capita GDP growth. Finally, the increasing openness represented that,
in 1958-74, the model’s predicted growth practically doubled the counterfactual rate
obtained by keeping constant the pace of openness that prevailed in the 1950s.
The change in the rate of forecasted growth between successive long swings can be
decomposed, using equation (5) of Table 6, into the contributions of a catching-up effect
(which includes the initial values of income and schooling, and the impact of
‘reconstruction’), and those resulting from capital accumulation, population growth,
sectoral resource allocation, and changes in the degree of openness (Table 8).
TABLE 8
It appears that the deceleration during the Restauración (reduced to 1883-1920 here)
resulted from a weakening of the catching-up effect and the closing of the economy that
tended to offset the timid shift of resources away from agriculture. In the 1920s the increase
in capital accumulation was the main element behind growth acceleration and, once again,
the mild reallocation of resources was cancelled out by the lower exposition to international
competition. During the 1950s, in turn, growth acceleration was associated to increasing
investment and to catching up after the isolation of the previous decades. Nonetheless, lack
of openness still represented a brake on growth. It was during the decade and a half of
accelerated growth that followed the Stabilization Plan (1958-74) when increasing
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openness was its main contributor. Spain’s poor adjustment to international competition
following the oil crises of the 1970s evidenced the delayed negative consequences of
Francoist interventionism and protectionism. Shifts of resources away from agriculture and
non competitive industry (that had grown under the protectionist umbrella) mitigated the
slowdown of the decade of transition to democracy (to which the lack of openness
contributed) and stimulated growth after Spain’s admission in the European Community, to
which increasing openness and capital accumulation also contributed.
IV. Concluding Remarks.
Over one and a half centuries, the level of economic activity increased forty times
while income per person rose to 15 times its initial level. The distinction of three main
phases: 1850-1950, 1951-1974 and 1975-2000 confirms the continuity of growth between
1850 and 1950, in contrast with the widespread view of a nineteenth century characterised
by failure and a twentieth century of economic success.
Per capita GDP growth cannot be attributed exclusively to the Golden Age as there
is evidence of significant growth during 1850-1883 and in the 1920s. Alternatively, 1883-
1920, 1929-1952 and 1974-1986 represent phases of sluggish growth.
Spain underperformed over the long run mostly due to its sluggish growth in the
hundred years up to 1950. Higher destruction of human capital than of physical capital
during the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath help explain her performance during the
1940s and 1950s. Spain’s economy has been catching up with advanced countries over the
last fifty years in which 1959-74 stand out as a period of outstanding performance.
Structural change appears to have contributed significantly to growth acceleration while
lack of exposition to international competition represents a recurrent element of retardation.
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Appendix Statistical characteristics of the new GDP series
Whether a series is deterministic (trend stationary [TS]) or stochastic (difference
stationary [DS]) which then requires transformation to become stationary, has important
economic implications. While in the case of a trend stationary series an external shock will
not affect its long run performance, merely setting in motion a cyclical episode before
returning to the established trend, in the difference stationary case shocks lead to permanent
consequences. That is, the past has a stronger influence on the present when the series are
non stationary. From the point of view of growth theory such a distinction means that while
the trend stationary GDP follows the neo-classical model, the difference stationary trend is
closer to endogenous growth models (Crafts and Mills 1996, Ben-David, Lumsdaine and
Papell 1996).
Nevertheless, faced with a long macroeconomic series which has a unit root i.e. a
series which in principle is not stationary, the possibility that it may, actually, be a
stationary series with one or several permanent changes of level or trend ((Perron 1989,
Campbell and Perron 1991) exists. This possibility is clearly closer to the idea of growth
held by economic historians33.
INCLUDE TABLE A.1
The first results of the conventional unit root tests indicate that GDP, in levels,
displays non-stationary characteristics. The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test
confirm that both the absolute and the per capita GDP series are DS (Table A.1), that is to
say only the first differences are stationary. The GDP series would contain a unit root. This
represents that the mean of the series varies depending on the period considered.
Nevertheless, whether we are, in fact, dealing with stationary series which suffer changes of
level or trend in the long term needs to be investigated. In order to check for structural
changes it is necessary to establish the moment such a change would be expected. Once
again, there are two alternative options: to assign a specific date for the structural change
hypothesis or allow the structural break to be decided endogenously using recursive,
sequential or other procedures. While econometricians and time series analysts usually
33 Crafts and Mills (1996) add that, from a European perspective, discontinuities in the historical GDP series
are highlighted.
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prefer the second approach, historians tend to plump for the first34. The reason for this
preference for a formally imperfect system is to be found in the fact that time series
analysis provides a powerful tool which allows us to test historical hypotheses related to the
existence of phases of growth35.
INCLUDE TABLE A.2
In order to confirm the existence of a segmented series the model which appears in
Table A.2 has been tested, that includes dummy variables in the trend (DTit) and the level
(DUit) which take on the values DTit=(t-TBi) and DUit=1, if tTBi, and 0, otherwise;
where TBi (i=1, 2) is the specific time of the break. The structural breaks have been
introduced exogenously and different alternatives have been chosen according to the
conventional cut-off dates suggested by economic historians36. The break dates accepted
are those which maximize the value for the statistic t in the parameter corresponding to the
lagged GDP variable. The statistical significance of the breaks compares favourably with
the critical values obtained using a Monte Carlo simulation37. The value of the statistic t for
the lagged variable (Yt -l) has significance levels of 10 and 5 percent for absolute GDP and
GDP per capita respectively. It follows that as the lagged variable is significantly different
from 0, the existence of a unit root in the presence of structural change can be rejected. The
proposed structural breaks are all significant at 5 and 1 percent. The absolute and per capita
GDP series are trend stationary with structural breaks in level (1936) and in trend (1951
and 1975)38. The segmented trend of the economy is obtained using the regression equation
featured in Table A.3. The growth rates for each of the main phases identified for Spain’s
economic progress were derived by adding cumulatively the parameters of each dummy
variable indicating a break in trend (DTit) to the parameter of the time variable. The change
in level (DUit) caused by the Civil War influences these values.
34 Cf. Zivot and Andrew (1992) and Ben-David, Lumsdaine and Papell (1996), for the consideration of a
priori unknown breaks, while Perron (1989) and Crafts and Mills (1996), contrast previously defined breaks.
Cubel and Palafox (1998) and, more recently, Pons and Tirado (2006) use the endogenous procedure to
establish structural breaks in their historical studies of Spain.
35 There is also a practical reason: a purely statistical approach to the series could mean establishing break
points which in fact are caused simply by measurement errors.
36 The dates for which structural breaks (TBi) have been investigated are: 1866-68, 1871-73, 1883-85, 1891-
92, 1898-1900, 1913-14, 1919-20, 1929-30, 1935, 1940, 1950-51, 1960-61, 1973-75, 1985-86, 1991-92.
37 I Thank Isabel Sanz for her help with these Monte Carlo experiments.
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Table A.1
Unit Root Tests
Ln(Yt-1) D(Yt-1)
GDP -0.64 (1) -9.99 (1)
Per Capita
GDP
-0.46 (1) -10.05 (1)
Note: Values for the t statistc that belongs to the coefficient of the lagged variable Yt-1
derived with the augmented Dickey-Fuller testYt =+t +Yt-1 +iYt-j+1 +t
Figures in brackets correspond to the number of lags in the dependent variable required to
eliminate autocorrelation. Critical significant values at 1, 5 y 10 percent are, respectively, –
4,02, -3,44 and -3,14.
38 Pons and Tirado (2006) find structural breaks in 1935, 1940 and 1960.
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Table A.2
Unit Root Tests Including Exogenous Structural Breaks
(dependent variable:Yt)
GDP Per Capita
GDP
variable coefficient t statistic coefficient t statistic
constant -7.7362 (-4.08)b -5.6285 (-4.29)a
time 0.0057 (4.11)b 0.0042 (4.37)a
lnY t-1 -0.3628 (-4.12)c -0.4175 (-4.49)b
Y t-1 0.2205 (2.99)a 0.2320 (3.30)a
DU1935 -0.0867 (-2.82)b -0.1323 (-3.54)a
DT1950 0.0181 (4.10)
b 0.0182 (4.49)a
DT1974 -0.0131 (-4.35)a -0.0116 (-4.59)a
R2 ajusted 0.34 0.37
Durbin-Watson 1.87 1.83
F statistic 13.55 15.49
Notes: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller that incorporates structural breaks implies a
regression as
Yt =+t +Yt-1 +cjYt-j +DUit +DTit +t
a, b and c indicate significance levels at 1, 5 y 10 percent, respectively, as result from the
critical values established after 1,500 Monte Carlo iterations.
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Table A.3
Trend Growth Regression. 1850-2000
(dependent variable: ln Yt)
GDP Per Capita
GDP
variable coefficient t statistic coefficient t statistic
constant -21.0503 -43.04 -13.4825 -33.65
time 0.0155 59.84 0.0100 47.21
DU1936 -0.2338 -11.42 -0.3163 -19.53
DT1951 0.0480 62.65 0.0423 58.34
DT1975 -0.0319 -26.62 -0.0252 -20.81
R2 ajusted 0.997 0.995
F statistic 12392 7024
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Table 1
Phases of Growth in Spain, 1850-2000 (%)
(annual average logarithmic rates of change)
GDP Population Per Capita
GDP
1850-2000 2.4 0.6 1.8
1850-1950 1.3 0.6 0.7
1950-1974 6.4 1.0 5.4
1974-2000 3.0 0.4 2.6
1850-1883 1.8 0.4 1.4
1883-1920 1.2 0.6 0.6
1920-1929 3.5 1.0 2.6
1929-1952 0.6 0.9 -0.3
1952-1958 4.4 0.8 3.5
1958-1974 6.9 1.1 5.9
1974-1986 2.5 0.7 1.8
1986-2000 3.5 0.2 3.3
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003).
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Table 2
Decomposing Per Capita GDP Growth. 1850-2000
Per Capita GDP/ Employment EAP PAP/
GDP employee /EAP /PAP Population
1850-2000 1.8 1.7 -0.1 0.1 0.1
1850-1950 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.1
1950-1974 5.4 5.3 0.0 0.4 -0.3
1974-2000 2.6 2.6 -0.5 0.2 0.4
1850-1883 1.4 1.3 0.1 0.0
1883-1920 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.0
1920-1929 2.6 2.4 0.0 0.1
1929-1952 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.3
1952-1958 3.5 3.0 0.0 0.8 -0.4
1958-1974 5.9 6.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.3
1974-1986 1.8 4.0 -1.8 -0.8 0.4
1986-2000 3.3 1.4 0.6 1.0 0.3
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003).
EAP: Economically Active Population; PAP: Potentially Active Population (15 to 64 years)
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Table 3
Structural Change and Labour Productivity Growth. 1850-2000
GDP/EAP Internal Structural Internal Structural
Productivity Change Productivity Change
(shift-share) (lower bound) (revised) (upper bound)
1850-2000 1.7 1.6 0.1 1.1 0.7
1850-1950 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4
1950-1974 5.3 4.9 0.4 3.4 1.9
1974-2000 2.6 3.0 -0.4 1.9 0.7
1850-1883 1.3 1.1 0.2 1.1 0.2
1883-1920 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.3
1920-1929 2.4 2.1 0.4 1.1 1.3
1929-1952 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0
1952-1958 3.0 2.3 0.7 1.3 1.7
1958-1974 6.0 5.4 0.6 3.8 2.2
1974-1986 4.0 3.9 0.1 3.0 0.9
1986-2000 1.4 1.7 -0.3 0.9 0.5
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003).
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Table 4
Per Capita GDP Growth in Spain: An International Comparison
Spain Advanced Continental U.K. U.S.A.
Europe Europe
1850-1998 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.8
1850-1950 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.7
1950-1998 4.0 2.7 2.8 2.1 2.2
1850-1913 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.7
1913-1950 0.2 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.6
1950-1974 5.4 3.6 3.7 2.3 2.3
1974-1998 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1
1850-1883 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.8
1883-1913 0.6 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.6
1913-1920 0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 0.7
1920-1929 2.6 3.3 3.5 1.4 2.4
1929-1952 -0.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.3
1952-1958 3.5 3.5 3.6 2.0 0.5
1958-1974 5.9 3.7 3.9 2.5 2.7
1974-1986 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.1
1986-1998 3.3 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8
Sources: Maddison (2001, 2003), except for Spain, Prados de la Escosura (2003).
* Advanced Europe (population weighted average)
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, U.K., Sweden, Italy,
Finland, Norway, and Switzerland.
Continental Europe (unweighted): Advanced Europe, excluding the U.K.
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Table 5
Spain’s Relative Levels of Per Capita GDP (%)
(US Current Relative Prices)
Advanced Europe* Western Europe ** U.S.A.
8 countries 12 countries 14 countries
1850 91.0 64.2
1860 90.5 64.8
1870 75.8 56.0
1880 83.3 88.9 93.8 56.8
1890 79.4 85.1 89.9 56.8
1900 73.1 77.2 82.8 52.5
1913 72.3 75.9 80.8 51.1
1925 76.7 79.1 84.5 46.0
1929 75.1 77.6 82.9 46.2
1933 66.3 68.5 73.7 50.4
1938 46.4 47.8 51.3 33.8
1950 66.0 66.0 70.2 35.2
1955 64.9 64.8 69.0 36.4
1960 52.9 53.7 57.3 33.1
1965 60.9 61.7 65.8 42.1
1970 60.5 61.8 65.8 43.3
1975 71.1 72.0 76.7 57.3
1980 68.7 67.4 72.2 55.9
1985 68.6 67.6 72.1 48.1
1990 70.3 70.1 75.0 56.5
1996 71.7 70.3 74.3 54.7
1999 73.7 72.5 76.4 54.7
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2000). 1850-1990; OECD (1999). 1996, 1999.
* Advanced Europe
8 countries: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, U.K., and Sweden,
12 countries: 8 countries plus, Italy, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland.
** Western Europe
14 countries: 12 Advanced Europe’s countries plus Greece and Portugal.
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Table 6
Determinants of Growth in Europe, 1820-1990
(TSLS pool regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.0811
(5.490)
0.1030
(6.296)
0.1064
(6.156)
0.2630
(6.966)
0.2292
(5.141)
LY90 -0.0119
(-5.392)
-0.0157
(-6.597)
-0.0171
(-6.264)
-0.0353
(-7.694)
-0.0307
(-5.594)
SINVT 0.1158
(5.025)
0.1089
(4.233)
0.1074
(4.428)
0.1151
(4.856)
GPOP1 0.1252
(0.548)
0.1685
(0.365)
0.1330
(0.516)
0.0133
(0.042)
ESCOLAR 0.0038
(0.365)
-0.0036
(-0.387)
-0.0021
(-0.215)
AGLAB -0.0263
(-1.605)
-0.0228
(-1.369)
LSPOI -0.0075
(-2.825)
-0.0068
(-2.573)
GXB 0.0786
(2.241)
0.1067
(2.814)
TBIAS 0.0003
(8.944)
0.0002
(5.135)
0.0003
(4.831)
0.0003
(4.982)
0.0002
(3.241)
RCNSTRC -0.0141
(-1.467)
RCNSTRC2 0.1018
(2.364)
HPK 0.0053
(2.330)
Nº Obs. 163 127 108 89 85
R 2 0.364 0.516 0.525 0.722 0.689
S.E.Regression 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008
F-Statistic 47.455 34.628 24.615 23.874 21.688
Speed of
Convergence
0.0127 0.0170 0.0187 0.0435 0.0359
Instruments: Lagged and initial values of regressors.
(t statistics in brackets)
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP growth rate (%)
Constant: Constant term.
LY90: Log of real per capita GDP at the beginning of each period, in 1990 US $, PPP.
SINVT: Ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP, calculated as ten-year averages.
GPOP1: Rate of population of growth.
ESCOLAR: Primary and secondary school enrolment as a ratio to population aged 5 to 19 at the
beginning of each period.
AGLAB: Labour force in agriculture as a ratio to total labour force at the beginning of each period.
LSPOI: Index of production orientation (Log of Agricultural-Industrial output ratio), calculated as ten-
year averages.
GXB: Growth rate of exports ratio to GDP.
TBIAS: Time trend.
RCNSTRC: Dummy of reconstruction processes. For 1950-1960, it is the log of 1950/1938 per capita
income ratio; for 1920- 1929, the log of 1920/1913 per capita income ratio; otherwise, takes zero value.
RCNSTRC2: Square of RCNSTRC.
HPK: Human Capital to Physical Capital Ratio, proxied by the Post-World War ESCOLAR/SINVT to
the to Pre-World War ESCOLAR/SINVT ratio. For 1950-1960, it is the 1950/1938 ratio; for 1920, the
1920/1913 ratio; otherwise takes zero value
Source: Prados de la Escosura (2006c)
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Table 7
Per Capita GDP Growth in Spain: Predicted and Actual Rates (%)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Unconditional Solow Augmented Structural Structural Actual
convergence Solow (HPK ratio) growth
(Include Reconstruction Effect)
Panel A. Long-run trends
1850-2000 2.7 2.4 3.0 3.4 2.7 1.8
1850-1952 2.4 1.9 2.3 2.7 2.1 0.9
1952-1974 3.7 4.2 5.1 6.4 5.3 5.2
1974-2000 3.1 2.7 3.8 3.7 3.0 2.6
Panel B. Long swings
1850-1883 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.7 2.3 1.4
1883-1920 2.4 1.7 2.1 2.4 1.7 0.6
1920-1929 2.8 2.5 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.6
1929-1952 3.0 2.4 3.2 3.0 2.1 -0.3
1952-1958 3.5 3.8 4.7 4.5 3.0 3.5
1958-1974 3.6 4.0 4.9 6.6 5.7 5.9
1974-1986 2.9 2.6 3.6 3.3 2.6 1.8
1986-2000 3.0 2.5 3.6 3.6 2.9 3.3
Sources: Columns I-V computed with equations 1-5 from Table 6. Column VI, from Table 1.
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Table 8
Decomposing Changes in Predicted Per Capita GDP Growth
Change in Predicted Growth Rate due to
Catching-up Capital Population Resource Openness Predicted
Effect Accumulation Growth Allocation Growth Rate Growth
1883/1920-1850/1883 -0.8 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.3 -0.6
1920/1929-1883/1920 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.4 -0.3 1.0
1929/1952-1920/1929 -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.6
1952/1958-1929/1952 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 -1.1 1.0
1958/1974-1952/1958 -0.4 0.2 0.0 0.4 2.5 2.6
1974/1986-1958/1974 -3.0 -0.2 0.0 0.9 -0.9 -3.1
1986/2000-1974/1986 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.3
Percentage Change in Predicted Growth due to
Catching-up Capital Population Resource Openness
Effect Accumulation Growth Allocation Growth Rate
1883/1920-1850/1883 124.7 -17.9 -0.3 -59.7 53.3
1920/1929-1883/1920 27.6 65.1 0.6 38.9 -32.1
1929/1952-1920/1929 154.7 -2.8 0.3 -14.1 -38.1
1952/1958-1929/1952 82.1 105.4 0.0 24.2 -111.8
1958/1974-1952/1958 -16.5 7.3 0.1 14.2 94.9
1974/1986-1958/1974 95.2 4.7 0.1 -28.7 28.7
1986/2000-1974/1986 -136.5 34.9 -2.5 129.9 74.2
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Graph 1
Real Per Capita GDP, 1850-2000
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Graph 2
Total Population and Potentially Active Population (Ages 15-64):
Smoothed Rates of Variation
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Graph 3
Potentially Active Population to Dependent Population Ratio, 1850-2000
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